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THE AVAILABILITY OF THE INPARIDELICTO
DEFENSE IN TIPPEE-TIPPER RULE 10b-5
ACTIONS AFTER DIRKS v. SEC
He who comes here for relief, must
draw his justice from pure fountains1
The defense of in pari delicto, which means "of equal fault,' 2 devel-
oped at common law3 to preserve the decorum of the courts.4 The de-
fense has met with considerable resistance in the United States when
raised in an attempt to bar actions alleging violations of federal anti-
trust5 and securities6 laws. The Supreme Court allows the in pari
1. Austin's Adm'x v. Winston's Ex'r, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 32, 47 (1806).
2. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 135 (1968). The
defense derives from the Latin expression, "in par delicto pot/or est conditio possidentis (defnden-
is). In a case of equal or mutual fault (between two parties) the condition of the party in posses-
sion (or defending) is the better one." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 711 (rev. 5th ed. 1977).
3. Lord Mansfield first discussed the in pari delicto defense in Smith v. Bromley, 99 Eng.
Rep. 441 (1760) and Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (1775). For nineteenth century views
of the defense in state courts, see Kahn v. Walton, 46 Ohio St. 195, 207-15, 20 N.E. 203, 209-13
(1889); Starke's Ex'rs v. Littlepage, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 368, 372-75 (1826); Austin's Adm'x v. Win-
ston's Ex'r, 11 Va. (I Hen. & M.) 33, 45-49 (1806).
For early Supreme Court treatments of the defense, see Second Russian Ins. Co. v. Miller, 268
U.S. 552, 562 (1925); Harriman v. Nothern Sec. Co., 197 U.S. 244, 295-98 (1905); St. Louis, V. &
T.H. R.R. v. Terre Haute & I. R.R., 145 U.S. 393, 407-08 (1892); Thomas v. Richmond, 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 349, 354-56 (1871).
For detailed reviews of in pari delicto 'r early English and American history, see Grodecki, In
Part Delicto Pot/or Est Conditio Defendentis, 71 LAW Q. REv. 254 (1955); Handler & Sacks, The
Continued Vitality ofIn Pari Delicto as an Anti-Trust Defense, 70 GEo. L.J. 1123, 1128-31 (1982);
Comment, Rule lob-5: The In Pari Delicto and Unclean Hands Defenses, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 1149,
1162-65 (1970).
4. See Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (1775). Lord Mansfield, although apprecia-
tive of the need to prevent courts from becoming forums for disputes grounded in illegality,
clearly expressed his distaste for those who invoked the in pari delicto defense to shield their
unlawful activities from reproach:
The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff and defendant
sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however,
that the objection is ever allowed; but is founded in general principles of policy, which
the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to real justice as between him and the
plaintiff; by accident, if I may so say.
Id at 1121.
5. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968); see gener-
ally Handler & Sacks, supra note 3; Comment, The Demise of In Pad Delicto in Pripate Actions
Pursuant to Regulatory Schemes, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 572 (1972).
6. Schick v. Steiger, 583 F. Supp. 841 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Kirkland v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,
564 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Xaphes v. Shearson, Hayden, Stone, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 882
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delicto defense an extremely limited role in antitrust litigation.' The
Court has yet to rule, however, on the appropriateness of the defense in
actions alleging violations of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion's (SEC) rule lOb-5. 8 Lacking Supreme Court guidance, the lower
federal courts have split over whether the in par delicto defense bars
"tippees" from bringing rule lOb-5 actions9 against their "tippers."' 0
This Note suggests a contemporary analysis for determining the cir-
cumstances in which a defendant-tipper may raise the in pari deliclo
defense to bar a tippee's rule lOb-5 action. Part I of this Note reviews
the Supreme Court's opinion in Perma Lfe Mufflers, Inc. v. Interna-
(S.D. Fla. 1981); Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Kulla
v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 426 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
7. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968); see also
infra notes 18-25 and accompanying text (discussing Perma Life).
8. Rule lOb-5, promulgated by the SEC under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange
Act, and codified as 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (Rev. Ed. 1984) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly .... (a) To employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, ... (b) To use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
9. The tippees-recipients of information-usually accuse the tippers of actively misrepre-
senting that they have "inside information" about imminent events that will affect the market
price of a particular corporation's stock. See, e.g., Grumet v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
564 F. Supp. 326, 337 (D.N.J. 1983) (takeover failed to occur); Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Can-
non, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (anticipated favorable "merger" terms worked to
tippee's detriment).
The tippee might also allege that the tipper falsely portrayed himself as an "insider." Xaphes v.
Shearson, Hayden, Stone, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 882, 886 (S.D. Fla. 1981). Alternatively, the tippee
may charge that the tipper intentionally failed to disclose all relevant information concerning a
corporation. Kirkland v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 564 F. Supp. 427, 432 (E.D. Mich. 1983). See also
infra note 168 (discussing differences between failure to disclose and active misrepresentation
cases).
10. For courts disallowing the defense, see cases cited supra note 6; see also Mallis v. Bankers
Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (1981); Lawler v. Gilliam, 569
F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1978). For cases allowing the defense, see Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555
F.2d 1152 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977); Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co,, 515 F.2d 591 (5th
Cir. 1975); James v. Du Breuil, 500 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1974); Kuebnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d
700 (5th Cir. 1969); Grumet v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 336 (D.N.J. 1983);
Summerlin v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., [1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
99,197, at 95,787 (N.D. Ga. March 23, 1983); Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F.R.D. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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IN PARI DELICTO
tional Parts Corp.,t I which limited the use of the inpari delicto defense
in antitrust law. Part II discusses the federal courts' contrasting views
applicability of in pari delicto's to tippee-tipper actions under rule lOb-
5.12 Part III reviews the Supreme Court's recent interpretations of the
scope of the duty to disclose under rule lOb-5.' 3 In part IV this Note
suggests that two recent Supreme Court decisions, Chiarella v. United
States4 and Dirks v. SEC,5 effectively rendered the in pari delicto de-
fense inapplicable in most tippee suits against tippers. 6 This Note con-
cludes that in situations where the defense potentially remains
applicable, the courts will best promote the goals of the securities laws
by refraining from a wholesale adoption or rejection of the in pari
delicto bar. Instead, to achieve equity in a given case, courts should
allocate loss between parties by scrutinizing their conduct under a com-
parative fault analysis.17
I. IN PAP1 DELICTO AND THE WARREN COURT
In Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.,'" the
Supreme Court considered whether the inparidelicto defense could bar
treble damage antitrust actions.' 9 The Court reversed lower court
holdings that allowed the defense,20 but the case produced a spectrum
of opinions disagreeing on the circumstances in which an antitrust de-
fendant could invoke the inpari delicto defense.2' Justice Black, writ-
11. 392 U.S. 134 (1968). See ixfra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 26-126 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 127-154 and accompanying text.
14. 445 U.S. 222 (1980); see infra notes 127-44 and accompanying text (discussing Chiarella).
15. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983); see infra notes 145-54 and accompanying text (discussing Dirks).
16. See infra notes 155-90 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 191-205 and accompanying text.
18. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
19. In Perma Life, the plaintiffs, "Midas Muffler Shops" dealers, brought an antitrust action
seeking treble damages against Midas, Inc. and its parent corporation, International Parts Corp.
Id at 135. The dealers alleged that the defendants conspired, via their sales agreements with the
dealers, "to restrain and substantially lessen competition" in violation of the Sherman and Clay-
ton Acts. Id.
20. Id at 142. The lower courts maintained that the plaintiff had voluntarily entered their
sales agreements with defendants and had made "enormous profits." Id at 138. Justice Black
noted that the Court of Appeals had asserted that "[i]t would be difficult to visualize a case more
appropriate for the application of theparidelicto doctrine." Id (quoting Perma Life Mufflers, Inc.
v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692, 699 (7th Cir. 1967)).
21. See 392 U.S. at 135 (majority opinion); id at 142 (White, J., concurring); id at 147 (For-
tas, J., concurring in the result); id at 148 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result); id at 153
(Harlan, J., with whom Stewart, J., joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Number 3]
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ing for the Court, asserted that because of its broad scope, the in pari
delicto defense had no place in antitrust litigation.22 Justice Black em-
phasized that courts should avoid "broad common law barriers to re-
lief' when private actions promoted "important public purposes. 23
Five Justices, however, agreed that in certain narrowly defined cir-
cumstances, the plaintiffs culpability should serve as a defense to anti-
trust actions. These Justices agreed in four separate opinions that
courts should bar parties who bear substantially equal fault for perpe-
tration of an unlawful activity from pursuing actions against each
other.2 4 Justices Marshall, Harlan, and Stewart expressed concern that
wrongdoers might reap a windfall from a treble damages award against
their co-wrongdoers.25 The divergence of opinions left lower courts
uncertain whether to apply the common law in par delicto defense
outside the antitrust context.
22. Id at 140.
23. Id at 138. Justice Black, joined by Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Douglas, Brennan,
and White, also asserted three other grounds supporting the Court's decision to bar the in parl
delicto defense in antitrust actions. First, Justice Black contended that the in pari delicio defense
interfered with the public policy of promoting competition. Id at 139. "A more fastidious regard
for the relative moral worth of the parties would only result in seriously undermining the useful-
ness of the private action as a bulwark of antitrust enforcement." Id Justice Black also asserted
that civil and criminal penalties would offset any windfall gains accruing to plaintiffs who had
themselves violated the antitrust laws. Id Finally, Justice Black maintained that, contrary to the
opinions of the lower courts, the Midas dealers had not voluntarily participated "in any meaning-
ful sense" in the defendant's anticompetitive activities and certainly had not "aggressively sup-
ported" the defendant's "monopolistic scheme." Id at 139-40.
24. Id at 146 (White, J., concurring); id at 147 (Fortas, J., concurring in the result); id at 149
(Marshall, J., concurring in the result); id at 156 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
25. Justice Marshall did not share Justice Black's view that civil and criminal actions would
deter potential plaintiffs from entering anticompetitive agreements. See supra note 23. Justice
Marshall argued that a wholesale bar of the inpari delicto defense would allow parties to recover
their losses in the event that their anticompetitive schemes failed, thus giving such parties "new
incentive" to violate the antitrust laws. 392 U.S. at 151 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result).
Justice Marshall also stressed the need to examine the equities between the parties to ensure that a
party would not profit from his wrongdoing. Id
Justices Harlan and Stewart agreed in principle with Justice Marshall:
When a person suffers losses as a result of activities the law forbade him to engage in, I
see no reason why the law should award him treble damages 'from his fellow offend-
ers. . . . Even if the threat of intra-conspiracy teble damages had some deterrent effect,
however, I should not think it a too "fastidious regard for the relative moral worth of the
parties,"... to decline to sanction a kind of antitrust enforcement that rests upon a
principle of well-compensated dishonor among thieves.
Id at 154 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Id at 139).
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II. IN PA4M DELICTO IN RULE lOb-5 ACTIONS INVOLVING TIPPERS
AND TIPPEES
A. The Rule 10b-5 Setting
Rule 1Ob-5 tippee-tipper actions in which inpari delicto plays a role
present a recurring fact situation. The scenario typically begins when
the tipper26 contacts his tippee.27 The tipper induces the tippee to be-
lieve that he possesses "inside information" indicating that the value of
a particular corporation's stock will rise.28 Relying upon the tipper's
representations, the tippee purchases a block of the corporation's
stock.2 9
Instead of increasing in value, the purchased stock takes an unex-
pected turn for the worse.3" The surprised and angry tippee sells the
securities at a substantial loss.3 Seeking recourse against the unrelia-
ble "tipper," the tippee brings an action alleging violations of rule lOb-
5. The tippee usually maintains that the tipper's "tip" constituted an
active misrepresentation.32 The tipper then raises the in pari delicto
26. Most in pari delicto cases feature a stockbroker as the tipper. See, e.g., Kirkland v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 564 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Grumet v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
564 F. Supp. 336 (D.N.J. 1983).
27. Tippees purchasing corporate stock on the basis of a "tip" usually lack any direct rela-
tionship with the corporation. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 (1983). For a brief review of
the general attributes of tippees, see Xaphes v. Shearson, Hayden, Stone, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 882,
884 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
28. The tipper most often asserts knowledge of an imminent merger or takeover. See, e.g.,
Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1154-56 (3d Cir.) (proposed merger), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 965 (1977); Xaphes v. Shearson, Hayden, Stone, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 882, 884 (S.D. Fla.
1981) (proposed takeovers).
29. The usual tippee, long on optimism and short on cash, purchases stock "on margin"
through a broker. See, e.g., Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 702 (5th Cir. 1969). The
expectation of a quick windfall profit often persuades otherwise conservative tippees to enter spec-
ulative investments. See, e.g., Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1155 (3d Cir.) (at-
torney purchased quantity of three-month "call" options), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977);
Kirkland v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 564 F. Supp. 427,432 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (employee of the Dicta-
phone Company persuaded to sell his Pitney-Bowes stock to finance purchases of stock in alleged
takeover targets).
30. See, e.g., Kirkland v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 564 F. Supp. 427, 432 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (pur-
ported takeover target's price plunged within two weeks of tippee's purchases); Nathanson v.
Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (forecasted merger occurred, but
at terms unfavorable to the tippee).
3 1. The tippee often unwillingly sells the shares to meet margin requirements. Grumet v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 336, 337 (D.N.J. 1983).
32. Id The tippee often further alleges that the tipper falsely represented himself as an "in-
sider" and that the tipper failed to disclose all the information he possessed concerning the tip-
pee's investment. See supra note 9; infra note 168.
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defense, asserting that the tippee also violated rule lOb-5 by failing to
disclose the supposed "inside information" prior to trading.33
Since 1969 federal courts have considered the applicability of the in
pari delicto defense to analogous fact situations in more than a dozen
cases.3 4 The three pairs of cases reviewed below present the federal
courts' spectrum of arguments for and against acceptance of the inpari
delicto defense.35
B. In Pari Delicto: 1969-71
In the three years following the Perma Lfe decision, two federal
courts reached opposite conclusions in deciding whether a tipper-de-
fendant could raise the inpari delicto defense.3 6 In Kuehnert v. Texstar
Corp, 7 a divided Fifth Circuit38 allowed the defense, 9 while the court
33. See Grumet v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 336, 337-38 (D.N.J. 1983);
Kirkland v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 564 F. Supp. 427,432-33 (E.D. Mich. 1983). Inparidelicto usually
is raised on a motion for summary judgment, see cases cited supra, but the tipper occasionally
raises the defense on a motion to dismiss. See Xaphes v. Shearson, Hayden, Stone, Inc., 508 F.
Supp. 882, 884 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
34. See E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Berns, 682 F.2d 173, 176 n.6 (8th Cir. 1982) (collecting cases);
see also cases cited supra notes 6 & 10.
35. See infra notes 36-126 and accompanying text.
36. See Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969); Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin,
Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); see also infra notes 37-73 and accompanying text.
The Kuehnert and Nathanson decisions provoked substantial commentary. See, e.g., Bell, How to
Bar an Uninnocent Investor-The Validity of Common Law Defenses to Private Actions Under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 1 (1970); Jacobs, The Impact of Securities
Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 on Broker-Dealers, 57 CORNELL L. Rav. 869 (1972); Nea, Limitations on
Defenses Under 10(b): In PariDelicto and Unclean Hands, 5 U. RICH. L. REv. 251 (1971); Ruder,
Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Par
Delicto, IndemnpFcation, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597 (1972).
For student commentary, see Note, Pearlstein v. Scudder & German: Implied Rights ofActlon
for Violation ofFederalMargin Requirements andthe Demise of the In Pari Deicto Defense, 66 Nw.
U.L. REv. 372 (1972); Comment, In Pad Delicto as a Bar to Tiopee'r Recovery Under Rule 10b.5
The Concept of '"ublic Interest" in Trade Regulation Compared, 11 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv.
257 (1970); Comment, Tpsters, Tippees, and the Doctrine of In Par! Delicto, 50 B.U.L. REv. 87
(1970); Comment, The Demise of In Par! Delicto in Private Actions Pursuant to Regulatory
Schemes, 60 CALIF. L. Rav. 572 (1972); Comment, Rule 10b-5 The In Par Delicto and Unclean
Hands Defense, 58 CALIF. L. Rav. 1149 (1970); Comment, Securities Regulation: Doctrines of In
Pari Delicto and Unclean Hands Held to Bar 10b-5 Recovery by Tippee Against Corporate Insider,
1969 DUKE L.J. 832; Comment, Plaintiff's Conduct as a Bar to Recovery Under the Securities Acts:
In Pari Delicto, 48 Tax. L. REv. 181 (1969).
37. 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
38. Judge Aldrich of the First Circuit, sitting by designation, wrote the majority opinion
joined by Judge Dyer. Judge Godbold dissented.
39. 412 F.2d at 705.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss3/7
Number 3] IN PARI DELICTO
in Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc.4" held that the defendant-
tipper could not assert that the plaintiff-tippee was in pari delicto.
In Kuehnert, defendant W.T. Rhame, an officer of Texstar Corpora-
tion, informed the plaintiff, Kuehnert, that Texstar would soon enter a
merger that would substantially increase dividends and Texstar's mar-
ket price.4 Kuehnert purchased a block of Texstar stock,42 but
Rhame's predictions proved erroneous and Kuehnert lost his entire in-
vestment.43 Kuehnert brought suit against Rhame and Texstar, alleg-
ing a rule lOb-5 violation. 44 In response, the defendants maintained
that Kuehnert had also violated rule lOb-5 by failing to disclose mate-
rial, nonpublic information prior to trading.45
The Kuehnert court held that the plaintiff had violated rule lOb-5's
implied prohibition against insider trading46 and thus stood in pari
delicto with the defendants. 47  The court relied on the broad language
"any manipulative or deceptive device" in section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act (the 1934 Act)48 to support the proposition that
rule lOb-5 proscribed both successful and attempted frauds.49 Kuehn-
ert's intent to scheme with Rhame to defraud the investing public thus
40. 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
41. 412 F.2d at 702. Rhame, formerly president of Texstar, supposedly confided this news to
Kuehnert in an attempt to persuade him to purchase a block of Texstar. Rhame hoped that
Kuehnert's purchases would give him working control, thus easing Rhame's difficulty in dealing
with other Texstar directors and shareholders. Id
42. Id
43. Id Kuehnert's brokerage house liquidated his account when he failed to meet his margin
calls. Id
44. id at 701.
45. Id at 702.
46. Id at 703. The court devoted only one paragraph to considering whether Kuehnert had
indeed violated rule lob-5. The court simply asserted that Kuehnert, although technically not an
insider, was a "tippee," a status requiring him to disclose inside information. For support the
court cited SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969). Texas Gulf Sulphur no longer represents a valid precedent for determining when a tippee's
duty to disclose arises. See Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983); see also infra notes 145-54 and
accompanying text (discussing Dirks).
47. 412 F.2d at 704. The court rejected Kuehnert's argument that because he had traded on
incorrect inside information, his purchases did not defraud any third parties and thus his actions
did not violate rule lob-5. Id
48. See supra note 8.
49. 412 F.2d at 704. The court buttressed its argument with the assertion that the related
equitable notion of "unclean hands" traditionally looked to the parties' intent as a basis for bar-
ring their actions. Id The court apparently had no qualms about relying on equitable principles
to bolster its argument for allowing the common law inpari delicto defense.
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operated to bar his action even though it was he who was defrauded. 0
Although the court established that the tippee-tipper action provided
a proper context to apply inpari delicto,51 it added that the public pol-
icy of protecting investors might preclude the use of the defense. 2 The
court perceived that two competing policy considerations were at issue.
Allowing the defense would fail to deter tippers from misrepresenting
that they possess inside information.5 3 Denying tippers the defense, in
contrast, would in effect give tippees an "enforceable warranty" that
their tipped "inside information" was true. 4
Balancing these considerations, the court held that public policy fa-
vored the use of the inparidelicto defense in actions brought by tippees
against tippers.5 5 First, the court maintained that the threat of third
party private suits and SEC enforcement actions adequately deterred
tippers from violating rule lOb-5. 5 6 In addition, the court noted that
although tippees and tippers present relatively equal threats to the in-
50. Id The court noted that Kuehnert's losses were directly related to his own attempted
fraud. Disclosure prior to trading would have apprised him of Rhame's untruthfulness and de-
terred him from trading. Id
51. In this respect, the court distinguished the antitrust situation in Perma Life on three
grounds. First, the court asserted that private actions alleging violations of the securities laws did
not promote the public interest in the same way as the treble damage antitrust provision. In the
securities context, the court argued, the principal question in a suit involves only an accounting
among joint conspirators. ld at 703; cf. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392
U.S. 134, 139 (1968) (private action is an "ever-present threat" to deter anticompetitive behavior).
Second, the court noted that Kuehnert was an active participant in a scheme to defraud the invest-
ing public. 412 F.2d at 703; see also Perma Life Mufflers, 392 U.S. at 149 (Marshall, J., concurring
in the result) (defendant in antitrust action should be able to assert in pad delicto when he can
show that plaintiff actively participated in the illegal scheme). Finally, the court found that
Kuehnert acted entirely voluntarily in dealing with Rhames. 412 F.2d at 704.
52. 412 F.2d at 704-05.
53. Id at 705.
54. Id Cf. Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1148 (2d Cir. 1970), (Friendly, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971). In Pearlstein, after the majority denied the inparl
delicto defense to a broker who had extended a client credit in violation of the margin require-
ments of the Federal Reserve System's Regulation T, Judge Friendly asserted that "[any deter-
rent effect of threatened liability on the broker may well be more than offset by the inducement to
violations inherent in the prospect of a free ride for the customer, who, under the majority's view,
is placed in the enviable position of'heads-I-win tails-you-lose.'" Id He added that the majority
decision "shocks the conscience and wars with common sense." Id. at 1145.
55. Id
56. 412 F.2d at 705. The court cited the Second Circuit's broad, all-encompassing view of the
duty of disclosure promulgated in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See supra notes 23 & 25 (discussing contrasting views of the
deterrence effect of private suits and agency enforcement actions in the antitrust field as expressed
in the Supreme Court's Perraa Lfe decision).
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vesting public, tippees are less visible to potential third party litigants,
and thus less likely to be sued for a rule lOb-5 violation.5 7 Finally, the
court asserted that the fear of financial loss would deter tippees from
trading on inside information.5 8
In Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc.,59 the plaintiffs, acting on
a "merger" tip from the defendant broker-dealers,6" purchased a sub-
stantial amount of TST Industries securities.6 Although the merger
took place, its terms were disadvantageous to the plaintiffs, who took a
substantial loss.62 The plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the defendants'
misrepresentations constituted a rule lOb-5 violation and common law
fraud.63 On the defendants' motion for summary judgment,6' the court
held that despite the plaintiffs' violation of rule 1Ob-5, the inpari delicto
defense did not bar plaintiffs' rule lOb-5 action.65
The Nathanson court initially determined that under rule lOb-5 the
57. 412 F.2d at 705.
58. Id; see also Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F.R.D. 89, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (advocating a policy
of "caveat tippee").
Judge Godbold, dissenting in Kuehnert, disagreed with the majority on two points. First, he
asserted that the majority incorrectly characterized the private suit as less important for enforcing
the secunties laws than the treble damages actions in antitrust litigation. 412 F.2d at 706 & n.2
(Godbold, J., dissenting). He also suggested that courts could best serve the purposes of the secur-
ities laws by seeking to deter tippers. According to Judge Godbold, focusing on the tipper would
deter the most knowledgeable of the parties, whose disclosure was "the first step in the chain of
dissemination." Id
59. 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
60. Defendants were unquestionably "insiders." Most of the defendant's officers and direc-
tors also were officers and directors of both merging corporations. Id at 51 & n.l.
61. Id at 51.
62. Id at 51-52. The Nathansons bought TST when its market price listed at $8 per share
and Elgin (the other merging corporation) listed at $17 per share. The Nathansons made their
purchases with the understanding that the merger would entitle holders of TST shares to one
share of Elgin in exchange for one share of TST. Id at 51. Under the terms of the actual merger,
holders of TST shares received one share of Elgin in exchange for every two and one-half shares
of TST. Id. at 52.
63. Id at 51. Plaintiffs rule lob-5 action and its common law fraud counterpart are similar
actions. In both instances the plaintiff alleges that the defendants actively misrepresented a mate-
rial fact. The fraud lies between the parties in such situations. The defendants' fraud, grounded
in an active misrepresentation, must be distinguished from the rule lOb-5 violation in which plain-
tiffs allegedly act inpari delicto with defendants. The latter fraud arises from the parties' failure to
disclose material, nonpublic information prior to trading (or instigating trading) and operates as a
fraud against the public. For a general discussion of the current relation between fraud, rule lOb-
5 and the in par/ delicto defense, see infra notes 155-205 and accompanying text.
64. 325 F. Supp. at 52. The defendants alleged that the plaintiffs acted in pari delicto by
failing to disclose material, nonpublic information prior to trading. Id
65. Id at 53.
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plaintiffs, as tippees, had a duty to disclose material, nonpublic infor-
mation prior to trading.66 The court rejected the plaintiffs' contention
that trading on the basis of false information did not constitute fraud
against the public. The court reasoned that plaintiffs' failure to disclose
seemingly material, nonpublic information constituted a potential
fraud and thus a violation of rule lOb-5.67
Although the court found the plaintiffs in violation of rule lOb-5, it
asserted that if the plaintiffs' suit promoted public policy, the defend-
ants could not raise the inpari delicto defense.68 The Nathanson court's
view of public policy in the tippee-tipper context contrasted sharply
with the Kuehnert court's conclusions. 69 The Nathanson court asserted
that both private suits under the securities laws and treble damage ac-
tions in antitrust litigation served "as a means not only of redressing a
private wrong, but also of protecting the public interest."70 After ex-
amining the relative fault of the parties, the court maintained that in
the "usual situation 71 the tipper presented a greater threat than the
tippee to the policies underlying the securities laws.72 The court con-
cluded that denying the tipper the in par! delicto shield would most
effectively protect the investing public.73
66. Id See supra note 46 (same approach followed in Kuehnert). The Nathanson court con-
tended that in the 1934 Act Congress had intended to protect investors, insure fairness in the
secondary securities markets, and promote equal access to material information. 325 F. Supp. at
53 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969)). Cf. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3265 (1983) ("a purpose of the securities laws was to
eliminate 'use of inside information for personal advantage' ") (quoting Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961)).
67. 325 F. Supp. at 55. AccordKuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir, 1969).
For a discussion of the effect of recent Supreme Court decisions on the Nathanson and Kuehnert
courts' reasoning concerning potential fraud as a violation of rule lOb-5, see /,nfranotes 170-83 and
accompanying text.
68. 325 F. Supp. at 55-56. Accord Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir.
1969).
69. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
70. 325 F. Supp. at 54. See also id at 56 n.30 ("In both situations, private litigation serves to
deter violations and to encourage injured parties to expose violators to the public.") (quoting 5
GA. L. Rav. 166, 177 (1970)). But see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (discussing the
Kuehnert court's view).
71. 325 F. Supp. at 57. The court possibly contemplated that in some situations, the tippee, if
"sophisticated," might present a potential threat to the investing public equivalent to that of the
usual tipper. See Kirkland v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 564 F. Supp. 427, 435 (E.D. Mich. 1983). For
further discussion, see infra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
72. 325 F. Supp. at 57.
73. Id The court discounted the Kuehnerl court's fears of giving a "windfall" or "enforceable
warranty" to the tippee. "'In our view the danger of permitting a windfall to an unscrupulous
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C. In Pari Delicto: 1977-1981
Federal courts reevaluated the inpari delicto defense almost a decade
after the Kuehnert-Nathanson division in Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National
Bank"4 and Xaphes v. Shearson, Hayden, Stone, Inc." In Tarasi, the
plaintiffs76 purchased a block of stock and several call options after
receiving a confidential "merger" tip from defendant Mialki, a bank
officer." The merger failed to materialize and the plaintiffs sustained a
$22,000 loss.7" Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the defendants' affirma-
tive misrepresentations constituted a violation of rule lOb-5.79 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment, holding that the doctrine of in pari delicto barred
the plaintiffs' action.80
After finding that the plaintiffs had violated rule lOb-5, 81 the court
investor is outweighed by the salutary policy effect which the threat of private suits for compensa-
tory damages can have upon brokers and dealers above and beyond the threats of governmental
action by the Securities and Exchange Commission.' ") Id (quoting Pearlstein v. Scudder & Ger-
man, 429 F.2d 1136, 1141 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971)).
74. 555 F.2d 1152 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977).
75. 508 F. Supp. 882 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
76. The plaintiffs were a used car salesman Mr. Tarasi, his aunt, and an attorney George
Sampas. Sampas' decision to purchase call options instead of common stock evidences his relative
sophistication in comparison with the average tippee. 555 F.2d at 1154-55.
77. Id at 1154. Mialki advised plaintiffs that a certain Meridian Industries would soon enter
a merger and probably "double in value." Id
78. Id at 1154-56. Plaintiffs' stock plunged from a value of $8 per share to $1 per share and
plaintiff Sampas' options expired worthless. Id at 1156.
79. Id
80. Id at 1164.
81. Id at 1161. The court assumed that plaintiffs' role as "tippees" automatically gave them
the obligation to disclose inside information prior to trading. This view followed the broad views
of rule lOb-5's coverage expressed in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495
F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974) and SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See infra note 143 (noting the confusion which resulted after the
Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), in determining when
tippees had a duty to disclose). For a discussion of Chiarella see infra notes 132-43 and accompa-
nying text.
For a post-Chiarella treatment of this issue in the inparidelicto context, see Xaphes v. Shearson,
Hayden, Stone, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 882 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Kulla v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 426 So. 2d
1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). See also infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text (discussion of
Xaphes). But see Grumet v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 336 (D.N.J. 1983).
The Supreme Court finally identified the source of tippees' duty to disclose in Dirks v. SEC, 103
S. Ct. 3255 (1983). See infra notes 145-54 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Dirks'
impact on the in pari delicto defense's use in actions between tippees and tippers, see infra notes
157-90 and accompanying text.
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held that the parties were equally at fault,82 and concluded that a
proper basis existed for invoking the inparidelicto defense.83 The court
then considered the competing public policy considerations to deter-
mine whether allowing the in pari delicto defense would promote the
purposes of the securities laws. Three factors led the court to allow the
defense. First, allowing tippers to use the defense would deter many
tippee violations of rule lOb-5.84 Second, the court stressed the impor-
tance of preserving "the integrity of the courts and preventing wrong-
doers from profiting from their misdeeds. ' 85 Finally, the court argued
that the common law in pari delicto defense was more appropriate in
the context of a rule lOb-5 cause of action, which is judicially created,86
than in statutorily created actions such as the antitrust treble damages
provision.8 7
In Xaphes v. Shearson, Hayden, Stone, Inc.,"8 the Southern District of
Florida considered the effect on the in pari delicto doctrine of the
Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella v. United States,9 which held
that a trader does not incur a duty to disclose prior to trading unless he
82. 555 F.2d at 1162. The Tarasi court reached its determination that the parties were of
"substantially equal fault" by focusing on the extent to which the parties' acts ultimately contrib-
uted to plaintiffs' loss. The court asserted that the conclusion in Nathanson that the parties were
not substantially equal at fault resulted from that court's placing too much emphasis on "enforce-
ment considerations" and not enough emphasis on the causative element of plaintiff's loss. 555
F.2d at 1162 & n.50.
The court noted that the tippee-tipper context did not present a situation where the parties were
coconspirators and truly inparidelicto. Id at 1162 & n.47. See also Malamphy v. Real-Tex Enter.,
527 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1975) (in pari delcto properly invoked to deny experienced real estate
brokers recovery of investments in fraudulent real estate venture when they had willingly entered
the scheme to defraud the public); James v. Du Breuil, 500 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1974) (plaintiffs held
inpari delicto with defendant and denied recovery where plaintiffs violated federal regulations by
loaning stock to defendant insider in order to become part of an "organizer's trust" to gain greater
profits on merger).
83. 555 F.2d at 1162.
84. Id at 1163. The court also asserted that barring the inpari delicto defense undoubtedly
would increase the number of tippee actions against tippers. The court emphasized that many
tippee actions would still fail because of tippees' difficulty proving that their tippers had acted
with the requisite sclenter. Id See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); see also infra
note 198 (examining rule lOb-'s scienter requirement).
85. 555 F.2d at 1164. See also supra note 4 (discussing early history of inparl delicto).
86. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (recognizing an
implied private cause of action under rule lOb-5); f J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)
(recognizing implied cause of action under section 14(a)).
87. 555 F.2d at 1164.
88. 508 F. Supp. 882 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
89. 445 U.S. 22 (1980).
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has a fiduciary relationship with corporate shareholders.9" In Xaphes,
the plaintiff brought suit, alleging that he sustained heavy losses in the
stock market after making several purchases in reliance on defendant's
supposed "inside information."' The plaintiff charged that the de-
fendant's broker made intentional misrepresentations and falsely repre-
sented himself as an "insider."92
The court found that the plaintiff had not acted in pari delicto with
defendants in violating rule lOb-5. 93  The court maiAtained that the
plaintiff lacked a duty to disclose inside information because he was
not a tippee of an "insider." 94 To hold the plaintiffs inpari delicto, the
defendants had to establish that the broker had a duty to disclose. The
court held that if the defendants could not meet this burden, then the
plaintiff's "mere possession" of inside information did not impose on
him a duty to disclose.95 Without a finding that plaintiff had violated
rule lOb-5 the defendants could not raise the in pari delicto defense,
which only applies when a plaintiff has committed a legal wrong.96
D. In Pan Delicto: the Spring of 1983
In the early part of 1983, four courts reconsidered the role of inpari
90. Id at 230. For a discussion of Chiarella, see inra notes 132-44 and accompanying text.
91. 508 F. Supp. at 884. Defendant's broker-employee allegedly maintained that he knew of
several imminent takeovers. Id
92. Id at 886.
93. Id at 887.
94. Id at 886.
95. Id For a recent case reaching the same conclusion, see Kulla v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 426
So. 2d 1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). Kulla and Xaphes each involved defendants who were not
clearly insiders and who, at the time of their motion to dismiss, had not yet demonstrated their
insider status. The Kulla court asserted that before inpari delicto could bar a plaintiffs action, the
defendant must establish that plaintiffwas in fact a wrongdoer. Id at 1058. Relying on Chiarella,
the court contended that plaintiff could not violate rule lob-5 unless the defendant-tippers first
established their own insider status, which would impose on them the responsibility to disclose
their inside information or abstain from trading on it. Id The court reversed and remanded for a
finding of whether defendants met these tests. Id at 1060.
96. 508 F. Supp. at 886. The court also asserted that the plaintiffhad no duty to disclose false
inside information. The court reasoned that Chiarella imposed no duty to disclose any informa-
tion that is not material, inside information. Id The court's rationale is unpersuasive, however,
because it fails to address the question whether the plaintiffs actions constituted an attempted
fraud in violation of rule lOb-5. Compare Grumet v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 564 F.
Supp. 336, 340 (D.N.J. 1983) (agreeing with Kuehnert that rule lOb-5 proscribes both attempted
frauds and successful ones) with itfra notes 169-83 and accompanying text (asserting that the
failure to satisfy the Dirks framework for determining a tippee's duty to disclose effectively pre-
vents a plaintiff from committing an actionable attempted fraud).
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delicto in tippee-tipper actions.97 A review of these cases reveals that
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks v. SEC98 the Kuehner-
Nathanson and Tarasi-Xaphes splits persisted between the federal
courts. 9 9
In Grumet v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,"° a New Jersey fed-
eral court approved the use of the inpari delicto defense. In Grumet, a
Shearson broker, Travis, induced the plaintiffs to buy stock in the tar-
get company of a supposed takeover bid by claiming to have inside
information.10' When the takeover failed to occur, the target com-
pany's stock plummeted in price, causing the plaintiff a substantial
loss.' 2 The plaintiff brought suit alleging that the defendant violated
rule lOb-5 by making affirmative misrepresentations or by recklessly
passing false information to the plaintiff.10 3 The court held that despite
Travis' questionable "insider" status, public policy barred plaintiff's
claim. 4
Relying on Xaphes10 5 the plaintiff argued that Travis was not an "in-
sider," and that Travis had not received inside information from an
insider."° The court rejected Xaphes' reasoning 0 7 and instead fol-
lowed Cady, Roberts & Co.,'08 an SEC enforcement action cited with
approval in Chiarella.°9 In Cady, Roberts, the SEC ruled that the de-
97. Grumet v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 336 (D.N.J. 1983); Kirkland v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., 564 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Summerlin v. Blyth Eastman Dillon &
Co., [1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 99,197, at 95,787 (N.D. Ga. March 23,
1983); Kulla v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 426 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983),
98. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
99. Kulla essentially followed Xaphes. 426 So. 2d at 1057-60. See supra note 95. Summer/in,
in contrast, asserted that Kuehner'.r reasoning applied with "equal force" and accordingly granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment. [1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
99,197, 95,793. For a discussion of Grumet and Kirkland, see infra notes 100-26 and accompany-
ing text.
100. 564 F. Supp. 336 (D.N.J. 1983).
101. 564 F. Supp. at 337. The defendant's broker allegedly informed the plaintiff that he
received his "inside information" from a director of the "targets" board of directors. Id
102. Id
103. Id Federal courts unanimously have agreed that a showing of "recklessness" on the de-
fendant's part will meet rule lOb-5's scienter requirement. For further explanation and a collec-
tion of the approving courts, see infra note 198.
104. 564 F. Supp. at 341.
105. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
106. 564 F. Supp. at 339-40.
107. Id at 340.
108. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
109. 445 U.S. 222, 227 n.8 (1980).
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fendant's broker violated rule lOb-5 when, without disclosing, he insti-
tuted trading in several discretionary accounts after receiving corporate
inside information."' The court reasoned that Travis, like the broker
in Cady, Roberts, violated rule lOb-5 by failing to disclose, although he
was not an actual insider."'
The court concluded that the plaintiffs conduct constituted a viola-
tion of rule lOb-5 because the rule "extended to attempted as well as
consummated frauds.""' 2 The court reiterated Kuehnert's assertion that
section 10(b)'s reference to "any manipulative or deceptive device"
prohibited attempted frauds." 3 Finally, the court further buttressed its
argument with the contention that plaintiffs conduct fell within rule
lOb-5(c)'s prohibition of any practice that "would operate" as a fraud
110. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). Cady, Roberts laid the framework for
modem analysis of rule lOb-5's duty to disclose. In Cady, Roberts, the SEC clarified rule lOb-5's
scope, holding that the rule extended to fraudulent actions beyond the usual shareholder-officer
face-to-face trading context, and to nontraditional insiders. Id at 914. The Commission held that
an obligation to disclose material, nonpublic information prior to trading arises when a relation-
ship exists that gives the informant direct or indirect access to corporate information intended
solely to fulfill a corporate purpose and not to benefit anyone personally. Id at 912. The Com-
mission justified its holding by noting "the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes ad-
vantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing." Id
The Second Circuit seized upon Cady, Roberts' "inherent unfairness" language to assert that
"anyone" in possession of inside information had the duty to disclose prior to trading. SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 883, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In
1980 the Supreme Court repudiated the Texas Gulf Sulphur reasoning. In Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Court premised the duty to disclose on the existence of a fiduciary
relationship, thus crystallizing Cady, Roberts' requirement that a special relationship must exist
between the trader and the corporation. Id at 226-28. .4ccordDirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3260
(1983); id at 3270 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
111. 564 F. Supp. at 340. The court also rejected the plaintiff's attempt to distinguish Cady,
Roberts. Id The plaintiff alleged that, unlike the broker in Cady, Roberts, Travis did not have a
link to the target company's board of directors. Id Relying on Justice Blackmun's dissent in
Chiarella, the court held that the concept of an insider was flexible and could encompass Travis.
The court expressed extremely questionable judgment in relying on Justice Blackmun's dissent.
The Chiarella majority opinion strongly presented the opposite argument, asserting that only a
very select group of "insiders"--those with a fiduciary relationship to corporate shareholders-
had a duty to disclose under rule lOb-5. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234 (1980). In
fact, the majority directly took issue with Justice Blackmun's "flexible insider" principle, char-
racterizing it as "not substantially different" from the rejected Texas GuIfSulphur approach, see
supra note 110, and criticizing it for its propensity to "raise questions whether either criminal or
civil defendants would be given fair notice that they have engaged in illegal activity." Id at 235
n.20.
112. 564 F. Supp. at 340 (quoting Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1159-60 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977)).
113. 564 F. Supp. at 340. See also supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
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or deceit. 114  Thus, application of the in pari delicto defense was
appropriate.
In Kirkland v. .F Hutton & Co.,115 the court followed the Nathan-
son court and denied the tipper the inpari delicto defense." 6 The Kirk-
land plaintiff lost $75,000 in the market' after a sharp decline in the
price of Trans World Corporation (TWC) stock, which the plaintiff had
purchased in reliance on a "tip" from defendant's broker. 1 8  The
plaintiff charged that Hutton and its broker intentionally failed to dis-
close to the plaintiff "potentially discouraging information" concerning
TWC stock, thus persuading him to make his purchases." 19
The court asserted that a defendant could raise the in par! delicto
defense only when the parties were "relatively equal in fault,"'120 the
plaintiff had acted voluntarily, 12 1 and the defense would promote pub-
lic policy. 122 Rejecting the majority view, the court argued that in the
usual tipper-tippee situation, the parties are not equally at fault.123 The
court acknowledged that tippers usually know it is illegal to trade on
the basis of inside information. 124 The court argued that tippees, in
contrast, vary greatly in their knowledge of the rules governing the
purchase and sale of securities. 125  The court emphasized that tippees,
114. 564 F. Supp. at 340. The Grumet court's "attempted fraud" arguments probably are no
longer valid. See infra notes 169-83 and accompanying text. After laying the legal framework for
the inparidelicto defense, the court held that allowing the defense would promote public policy.
The court's rationale closely followed that delineated in Kuehnert and Tarasl 564 F. Supp. at 341.
See supra notes 51-58 & 84-87 and accompanying texts.
115. 564 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
116. Id at 434.
117. Id at431.
118. Id at 432. The broker allegedly maintained that TWC was an imminent takeover target.
Id
119. Id Kirkland differs from other tipper-tippee cases in that plaintiff did not allege that the
defendant tippers made affirmative misrepresentations, but rather that the defendants persuaded
plaintiff to make his purchases by failing to disclose all the relevant information they possessed.
See infra note 168.
120. 564 F. Supp. at 435-36. See supra text accompanying note 24.
121. 564 F. Supp. at 435-36. See supra note 23.
122. 564 F. Supp. at 435-36. See supra notes 51-58 & 68-73 and accompanying text.
123. 564 F. Supp. at 435-36. Cf Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392
U.S. 134, 151, 153 (1968) (Marshall, J., concurring in the result) (asserting that the Court should
give great emphasis "to the equities as between the parties" and adopt a "respective-fault" ap-
proach for determining when parties are inpar delicto).
124. 564 F. Supp. at 435 ("the 'tipper,' who possessed information by virtue of an inside posi-
tion with the corporation and who passes it along to a 'tippee,' is ... almost always in a position
to understand the obligations attendant to the confidential information").
125. Id
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who often lack sophistication about the market, are less culpable than
their knowledgeable tippers for nondisclosure violations."z6
III. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE
In Chiarella v. United States'27 and Dirks v. SEC,1 28 the Supreme
Court established the circumstances in which tippers and tippees incur
a duty to disclose material, nonpublic information prior to trading
under rule lOb-5.129 The Chiarella and Dirks decisions undermine the
legal basis for the in pari delicto defense in most tipper-tippee cases,
130
and cast serious doubt on the defense's availability in the few remain-
ing cases in which considerations of public policy control.
31
In Chiarella the Supreme Court determined the circumstances that
impose upon a trader a duty under rule IOb-5 to disclose material, non-
public information prior to trading.132 Vincent Chiarella, a printer,
learned the identities of takeover targets through his employment with
a company engaged in printing corporate announcements. 33 Before
an SEC investigation exposed his activities, Chiarelia realized a
$30,000 profit from purchases and sales made immediately before and
after four corporate takeovers and one merger. 34 Chiarella was con-
victed of seventeen counts of violating rule lOb-5 35 and his conviction
126. Id The Court thus denied summary judgment, holding that issues of material fact re-
mained with respect to the relative fault of the parties and the scienter requirement. Id. at 437.
See infra notes 198 (discussing the scienter requirement); see also infra notes 191-205 (discussing
tippee and tipper sophistication).
127. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
128. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
129. See infra text accompanying notes 139 & 151-54.
130. See infra notes 157-83 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 184-90 and accompanying text.
132. For commentary on the Chiarella decision, see Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, & Informa-
tional Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. REv. 322 (1979); Dooley, En-
forcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1 (1980); Easterbrook, Insider Trading
Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 309;
Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: "Fairness" versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. LAW.
517 (1982); Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: 4 Post-Chiarella Restatement,
70 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1982). For a review of disclosure law as it stood between Texas Gulf Sulphur
and Chiarella, see Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to
Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798 (1973).
133. 445 U.S. at 224.
134. d at 224 & n.l.
135. Id at 225. The Securities Exchange Act (section 32(a)) provides for criminal penalties for
willful violations of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78fif(a). See 445 U.S. at 225 n.3.
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was afflrmed on appeal.1 36 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,1 37
reversed, 38 and held that a duty to disclose material, nonpublic infor-
mation prior to trading does not arise under rule lOb-5 if the trader
does not stand in a fiduciary relationship to corporate shareholders.139
Chiarella's "fiduciary relationship" requirement sharply limited the
duty of disclosure 140 in most instances to traditionally recognized insid-
ers such as corporate directors, officers, and high level employees. 14'
The Court failed to clarify, however, the circumstances in which tip-
pees of insiders incur a duty to disclose prior to trading.'42 The Court's
failure in this respect left open the question of when a tippee suing his
tipper for fraudulent misrepresentation under rule lob-5 also violates
rule lOb-5-an issue of significance for the in par delicto defense. 43
The source of tippee liability remained in doubt until the Court con-
fronted the issue in Dirks v. SEC.'"
In Dirks, Ronald Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding Corpo-
ration of America (EFCA), sought out Raymond Dirks, a noted invest-
ment analyst, in an effort to expose a massive fraud within EFCA.145
Dirks subsequently played a major role in exposing the EFCA fraud. 146
136. 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978).
137. 441 U.S. 942 (1979).
138. 445 U.S. at 237.
139. Id at 230, 232.
140. Chiarella represents a rejection of the Second Circuit's assertion in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cer. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), that "anyone in posses-
sion of material inside information must either disclose it to the investing public, or. . . must
abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such information remains
undisclosed." Id at 848. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231 (1980).
141. See Langevoort, supra note 132, at 20. Professor Langevoort correctly points out that
Chiarella'r rationale probably extended the duty of disclosure to certain other persons who usually
stand in a special "relationship of trust and confidence" to a corporation. Id The Supreme Court
later gave credence to Langevoort's assertion. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 n.14 (1983).
See infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
142. The Court merely stated in a footnote that "[t]he tippee's obligation has been viewed as
arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty." 445
U.S. at 230 n.12.
143. Some understandable confusion resulted from the Chiarella Court's citation in its foot-
note on tippee liability to Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d
Cir. 1974). After Chiarella's emphasis on the link between the duty to disclose and a fiduciary
relationship, Shapiro represented seemingly weak precedent because it relied on the Texas Gulf
Sulphur view that the duty to disclose arose in "anyone, in "mere possession" of inside informa-
tion. 495 F.2d at 237.
144. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
145. Id at 3258.
146. Id at 3259 n.8, 3263 n.18.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss3/7
IN PARI DELICTO
Prior to disclosure of the fraud, however, Dirks tipped several institu-
tional clients who liquidated approximately $16,000,000 in EFCA
holdings, a sell-off that caused a rapid, dramatic drop in EFCA's mar-
ket value.' 47
In an SEC enforcement action, Dirks was found guilty of aiding and
abetting violations of rule lOb-5.148 After granting certiorari 149 the
Supreme Court reversed the conviction,150 holding that the duty of a
tippee to disclose or abstain from trading on inside information derives
from the fiduciary duty the insider-tipper owes the corporation's share-
holders;' 5' where the insider does not tip for the purpose of securing a
personal gain, the tippee does not breach his derivative duty by trad-
ing.' 52 The Court also asserted that certain individuals outside the cir-
cle of traditional corporate insiders directly incur a duty of
disclosure.'53 The Court maintained that "under certain circum-
stances" professionals enjoying a "special confidential relationship"
with the conduct of a corporation's business directly acquire a fiduciary
responsibility and independently possess a duty to disclose. 5 4
147. Id at 3258-59.
148. Boston Co. Inst'l Investors, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
81,705, 80,816 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The administrative law judge suspended Dirks from association
with any registered broker for sixty days. Id The administrative law judge also censured four
institutions that had traded large blocks of EFCA subsequent to receiving tips from Dirks and
prior to the fraud's public exposure. Id at 80,867.
Dirks appealed to the SEC, In re Dirks, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1412 (1981), which reduced
Dirks' sanction to censure, and to the Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia, Dirks v. SEC,
681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), which affirmed the conviction.
149. 103 S. Ct. 371 (1982).
150. 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3268 (1983).
151. Id at 3264 (1983).
152. Id at 3265-66. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, stated that the proper test for estab-
lishing a fiduciary breach of duty requires an inquiry into whether the tipping insider secured a
direct or indirect personal gain. Id Justice Powell asserted that this test focused on "objective
criteria" such as "pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings."
ld (citing Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 and Brudney, supra note 132, at 348).
Justice Powell maintained that Secrist tipped for the commendable purpose of exposing the EFCA
fraud and thus failed to breach his fiduciary duty. Id at 3267 & n.27.
153. Id at 3261 n.14. For a discussion of the significance of this footnote, see Note, Dirks v.
SEC's Footnote Fourteen: Horizontal and Vertical Reach, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 477 (1984).
154. 103 S. Ct. at 3261 n.14. Two post-Dirks courts have considered the scope of footnote
fourteen. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 15 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that employees
of an investment banking form retained by an aggressor in a takeover fight did not owe a duty to
disclose pursuant to footnote fourteen); SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397, 1403 (C.D. Cal. 1983)
(close friend and business associate of corporate director owed a duty to disclose under footnote
fourteen as a "temporary insider").
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IV. ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION
Successful invocation of the in par! delicto defense depends on the
satisfaction of two conditions. First, the defendant must establish that
the plaintiff participated in a wrongful act with the defendant. The
parties' fault must be mutual, simultaneous, and relatively equal.'55
Second, the court must decide that allowing the inpari delicto defense
will promote applicable public policy. 56
After Dirks, defendants face considerable obstacles proving that
plaintiff-tippees violated rule lOb-5. A tippee lacks a duty to disclose
unless his tipper possesses a duty to disclose.157 The tipper must
demonstrate that he is an insider or that he received "inside informa-
tion" under the proper circumstances from an insider. A tipper satisfies
this first requirement in one of three ways. First, a tipper qualifies as
an insider with a duty to disclose if he occupies a corporate position
giving him a fiduciary relationship with corporate shareholders. 158
Such positions typically include a corporation's directors, officers, and
"upper echelon" employees.' 59 Alternatively, the defendant qualifies
as an insider if he occupies a "special relationship" with a corpora-
tion.' 60 Those potentially in such a relationship include attorneys, un-
derwriters, and accountants.' 61 Finally, the tipper also possesses a duty
to disclose if he receives material, nonpublic information from a recog-
nized "insider" who "tipped" the tipper for the purpose of securing a
personal gain. 162
If the tipper demonstrates that he possesses a duty to disclose, he
then must show that he "tipped" the plaintiff-tippee for the improper
155. See, e.g., Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1157 (3d Cir.), cerl. denied, 434
U.S. 965 (1977); Grumet v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 336, 339 (D.N.J. 1983);
Kirkland v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 564 F. Supp. 427, 435 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Xaphes v. Shearson,
Hayden, Stone, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 882, 885 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
156. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 155.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 151-52.
158. See supra text accompanying note 141.
159. See Brudney, supra note 132, at 343-47; Langevoort, supra note 132, at 18-24.
160. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
161. See Langevoort, supra note 132, at 20-21. The Supreme Court did not give an exclusive
list of those who qualify as "special" fiduciaries. The Court referred to "consultant(s) working for
a corporation," language that probably includes, under the right circumstances, engineers, market
analysts, university professors, public relations firms, and marketing-advertising agencies. See
Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 n.14 (1983).
162. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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purpose of securing a personal benefit.1 63 If a tipper meets these legal
requirements, his tippee derivatively possesses a duty to disclose prior
to trading." The tippee's failure to disclose thus constitutes a breach
of his duty and renders the parties "in pan delicto."
165
163. Id The tipper should find it easier to satisfy the "improper purpose" test than the prelim-
mary "fiduciary" test. Whereas the "fiduciary" requirement clearly limits the number of individu-
als with a duty to disclose, the insider easily can meet the "improper purpose" test. For instance,
brokers who are also corporate officers or directors tip for the improper purpose of securing a
personal gain when they tip for the purpose of receiving commissions or to cultivate future deal-
ings with their clients. Id See also supra note 41 and accompanying text (tipper in Kuehnert
tipped to induce his tippee-friend to make sizeable purchases, which when added to his own hold-
ings, would give him working control of his corporation).
164. See supra text accompanying note 152. The Dirks Court also contended that a tippee
only assumes a derivative fiduciary duty to corporate shareholders if, in receiving a tip, he "knows
or should know that there has been a breach" by the insider-tipper. 103 S. Ct. at 3264. Accord In
re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 651 (Comm'r Smith, concurring in the result).
165. See supra text accompanying note 155. Note that the tipper still must convince the court
that the invocation of the in pari delicto defense will promote public policy. See infra notes 184-
205 and accompanying text.
The Eastern District of Michigan recently reached an arguably improper result in considering
whether tippees in a lob-5 action had a duty to disclose. See Schick v. Steiger, 583 F. Supp. 841
(E.D. Mich. 1984). In Schick the defendant, an insurance broker, received a tip regarding a poten-
tial takeover from a close friend who was a member of the founding family of the target corpora-
tion. id at 843. The defendant immediately purchased a large quantity of stock in the target
corporation. He then tipped numerous investors who also purchased significant amounts of the
target corporation's stock in reliance on the defendant's supposed inside information. Id The
tippees bought and sold stock in the target corporation over a six month period. Although some of
the tippees realized gains from their trading, many incurred losses, especially after the "target"
corporation's stock dropped in price when the takeover failed to materialize. Id The plaintiffs
subsequently brought a lob-5 action against the defendant, who moved for summary judgment,
alleging that the plaintiff-tippees had acted in pari delicto with him in violating rule lob-5 by
trading on supposed material, nonpublic information. The court denied the defendant's motion
for summary judgment, id at 848, holding that the tippees did not acquire a duty to disclose and
consequently could not have acted inpari delicto with the defendant in violating rule lOb-5.
The court in Schick considered the impact of Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983), on the
availability of the inpari delicto defense. 583 F. Supp. at 846-48. Compare Berner v. Lazzaro, 730
F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1984) (court failed to consider whether Dirks had altered the analysis for
determining the appropriateness of the inpari delicto defense); Silverberg v. Paine, Webber, Jack-
son & Curtis, Inc., 710 F.2d 678 (1Ilth Cir. 1983) (same). The Schick court, however, considered
the facts of the case not in their true light, but as the plaintiffs had thought them to be, asserting
erroneously, see infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text, that "there is no difference in sub-
stance between a successful fraud and an attempt." 583 F. Supp. at 847 (citing Kuehnert v. Texstar
Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969)).
After recognizing that the defendant had a "close relationship" with his insider-tipper, 583 F.
Supp. at 847, the court contended that the defendant derivatively had acquired a duty to disclose
because his tipper had tipped him in order to confer a "friendly gift"--an improper purpose for
tipping according to the Court in Dirks. Id The court might also have concluded that the defend-
ant acquired a duty to disclose pursuant to footnote fourteen of Dirks because of his confidential
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The effect Chiarella and Dirks have on the availability of the inpari
delicto defense appears most visibly in the context of suits brought by
investor-tippees against their brokers.'66 If the broker fails to demon-
strate that he possesses a duty to disclose, his dutiless tippee's failure to
disclose indisputably does not constitute a violation of rule lOb-5.1
67
The tippee's failure to commit a wrongful act in such situations renders
inapplicable the inpari delicto defense. Neither the tipper nor the tip-
pee commits a fraud against the public. Only the tipper's fraud against
the tippee remains. 168
relationship with the insider-tipper. See SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397, 1403 (C.D. Cal. 1983);
supra note 154.
The court then, however, deviated from the proper mode of analysis and found that the plain-
tiff-tippees had not acquired derivatively a duty from the originalinsider. 583 F. Supp. at 847-48.
The court reached an incorrect conclusion because it failed to address whether or not the tippees
derivatively had acquired a duty to disclose from their tipper--the defendant. The defendant,
who either derivatively or directly had acquired a duty to disclose from his insider-tipper, clearly
tipped the plaintiffs for the improper purpose of securing a personal gain. The defendant hoped
that his tippees' purchases would drive up the price of the "target" stock that he had purchased
earlier. The defendant, then, tipped to secure an improper pecuniary gain. See Dirks v. SEC, 103
S. Ct. 3255, 3266 (1983) (recognizing pecuniary gain as an improper purpose for tipping); supra
notes 152 & 163 and accompanying texts. Furthermore, the plaintiffs knew that they had received
the supposed inside information as a result of tips from an insider to the defendant and from the
defendant to themselves. Both tips constituted a breach of the respective tipper's fiduciary duty.
583 F. Supp. at 843. The plaintiffs, thus, should have been recognized as having a duty to disclose.
In Schick, then, because both the plaintiffs and the defendant breached their respective fiduci-
ary duties, the legal basis existed for the application of the inparl delicto defense.
166. Such actions constitute the majority of reported tippee-tipper cases. In recognition of this
fact, one court took judicial notice of brokers' tendency to intimate to their clients that they have
inside information. Moholt v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 451 (D.N.J. 1979).
167. See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text; see also Silverberg v. Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 710 F.2d 678 (11th Cir. 1983). In Silverberg the court correctly denied
defendants the use of the inparidelicto defense when defendant Paine, Webber's broker, who was
not an insider, frauduently induced the plaintiff to make large purchases of Posi-Seal, Inc. Id. at
691. The court did not, however, consider whether the plaintiff, as a tippee, possessed a duty to
disclose. Judge Tuttle merely asserted that the plaintiffs purchases of Posi-Seal stock were "indis-
tinguishable" from the printer's purchases in Chiarella. Id A complete analysis of the in parl
deliao problem would have focused on the broker's noninsider status and his consequential lack
of a duty to disclose. Because the broker had no duty to disclose, his tippees had no derivative
duty to disclose prior to trading and thus did not violate rule lob-5 by failing to disclose their
reputed "inside information."
168. The tipper's lack of a duty to disclose will, in some circumstances, also operate to deprive
the plaintiff of his entire cause of action. If the tippee's action alleges that the defendant-tipper
failed to disclose potentially discouraging information (as opposed to allegations that the tipper
made an active misrepresentation), the tippee will have to demonstrate that the tipper breached a
duty to disclose material, nonpublic information to the tippee. See supra note 119 and accompa-
nying text. In such cases, therefore, the tipper's lack of a duty to disclose not only prevents impo-
sition of the in pari delicto defense, but also deprives the plaintiff of the ability to satisfy two
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Defendants typically assert that tippees' unsuccessful frauds none-
theless are covered by section 10(b)'s references to "any manipulative
or deceptive device" 169 or rule 1Ob-5's reference to any practice "which
operates or would operate as a fraud." 70 Prior to Chiarella and Dirks,
uncertainty as to the source of tippee liability17 1 contributed to the
courts' willingness to accept this argument.' 72 Federal courts accepted
the "attempted fraud" arguments because they deemed "mere posses-
sion" of inside information sufficient to raise a duty to disclose prior to
trading. 73  When the tipped "inside information" turned out to be
false or when the tipper was not a real "insider," it was merely factually
impossible for the tipper to harm the investing public. 174 The Kuehnert
court thus correctly asserted in 1969 that "[t]he absence of actual harm
to his vendors, as far as Kuehnert was concerned, was a pure fortu-
iy."'' 7 5 The courts properly interpreted tippees' behavior as actionable
"attempts" to violate rule lOb-5. Tippees could not raise factual impos-
sibility as a defense to a charge of attempt. 76
In the mid-1970's, however, the Supreme Court began to narrow the
scope of rule lOb-5.' 7 7 The Court's emphasis on the need to find fraud
crucial elements of a rule lOb-5 action alleging failure to disclose: defendant's duty to disclose
and his breach of that duty.
Federal courts also are likely to decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction over such a plaintiff's
possible common law tort claims. See Grumet v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 564 F. Supp.
336, 338 (D.N.J. 1983); In re Haven Industries, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 172, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
169. See supra note 8.
170. Id
171. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700,704 (5th Cir. 1969); Grumet v. Shear-
son/American Express, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 336, 340 (D.N.J. 1983); Moholt v. Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 451,452 (D.D.C. 1979); Inre Haven Industries, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 172, 178
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
173. See supra note 56. In the 1960's and early 1970's, decisions giving a broad interpretation
to rule lOb-5's coverage fit within the Supreme Court's mandate that the lower federal courts
should interpret the terms of the 1934 Act "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectu-
ate its remedial purposes." Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972);
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
174. See infra note 176.
175. Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969) (emphasis added).
176. W. LAFAVE & A. Scowr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 440 (1972). "Factual impossi-
bility" occurs when "what the defendant intends to accomplish is proscribed by the criminal law,
but he is unable to bring about that result because of some circumstances unknown to him when
he engaged in the attempt." Id
177. See Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (establishing that a
plaintiff lacks standing to assert a rule lOb-5 action if he is not a purchaser or seller of the security
in question); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (holding that negligence does not
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in rule lOb-5 actions,17 together with its concentration on defining the
"duty" aspect of the fraud,17 9 rendered obsolete the "attempted fraud"
rationale. Chiarella and Dirks settled the law governing the duty of
disclosure of a tippee and his insider-tipper. 180 After Dirks, if a tipper-
insider lacks a duty to disclose, or tips for a "proper" purpose,18' it is
legally impossible for the tippee to violate rule lOb-5 by failing to dis-
close prior to trading. Unlike factual impossibility, the law recognizes
legal impossibility as an absolute defense to a prosecution for an at-
tempt.182 Rule lOb-5, therefore, does not now cover tippees' attempted
frauds.18
3
The issue remains, however, whether the in pari delicto defense sur-
vives Chiarella-Dirks in situations where the tipper is the requisite type
of insider and tips for the improper purpose of securing a personal
gain. In this circumstance, both the tipper and tippee have committed
a fraud against the investing public, thus establishing the legal founda-
tion for applying the defense. The court then must decide whether ap-
plication of the defense will promote public policy. 8 4
Until recently courts asserted that "protecting the investing public"
was the preeminent public policy behind the securities laws.'t 5 After
Chiarella and Dirks, however, the Supreme Court arguably views rule
lOb-5's primary purpose as to prevent fraudulent gains by fiduciaries,
meet rule lOb-5's scienter requirement); Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)
(narrowing the definition of fraud under rule lOb-5 to those actions clearly involving "manipula-
tion and deceit"); see also supra notes 127-54 and accompanying text (reviewing Chiarella and
Dirks' narrowing of the scope of rule lOb-5's duty of disclosure).
178. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 420 U.S. 462, 472-74 (1977) (asserting that a mere
breach "of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction" without conduct involving
manipulation and deceit does not constitute rule lOb-5 fraud).
179. See supra notes 127-54 and accompanying text (reviewing Chiarella and Dirks).
180. See supra notes 139 & 151-52 and accompanying text.
181. See Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3267 n.27 (1983) (exposing corporate fraud is a proper
purpose for tipping).
182. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScowT, supra note 176, at 442 (asserting that "[t]he reason for not
convicting him has nothing to do with the failure of the enterprise, but rather with the absence of
any prohibition of the conduct whether completed or not") (quoting Hughes, One Further Foot.
note on Attempting the Impossible, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1005, 1006 n.l (1967)). See supra note 177
(describing conditions for factual impossibility).
183. Cf. Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969) (no "difference in sub-
stance between a successful fraud and an attempt").
184. See supra text accompanying notes 155-56.
185. See, eg., Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969); Summerlin v.
Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., [1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,197, at 95,793
(N.D. Ga. March 28, 1983).
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and not to protect the investing public.' 86 In Dirks the Court identified
the issue whether the tioper "tipped" to secure personal benefit as the
key to determining tippee liability.'87 The Court's focus on the tipper's
actions, and its decision to make the tippee's liability completely de-
pendent upon the tipper's actions, 188 suggest that the Court views the
tipper as the "greater threat" to the investing public.'89 Thus, if con-
fronted with the issue, the Court probably would choose to bar a tipper
from invoking the in pari delicto defense.'90
Acceptance of this conclusion'91 leaves the question whether a
wholesale foreclosure of the inpari delicto defense promotes public pol-
icy. 92 The apparent unfairness of giving tippees an "enforceable war-
ranty"'193 and of treating all tippees in the same manner, 94 casts doubt
on the wisdom of denying defendants the in pari delicto defense. The
courts recognize that not all tippees possess the same sophistication. 95
In view of this unfairness, courts seeking to promote the public poli-
cies of protecting investors and preventing fraudulent personal gain
should reject a defendant's assertion of in par! delicto as an absolute
186. Compare Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3265 (1983) (emphasizing the Court's determina-
tion to prevent fraud through the utilization of the improper purpose test: "'It is important in this
type of case to focus on policing insiders and what they do.' ") (quoting Investors Management
Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 648 (1971) (Commissioner Smith, concurring in the result)) with id at 3271
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (bemoaning the absence of protection for investors: "It makes no dif-
ference to the shareholder whether the corporate insider gained or intended to gain personally
from the transaction; the shareholder still has lost because of the insider's misuse of non-public
information.").
187. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
189. Accord Kirkland v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 564 F. Supp. 427, 434-46 (E.D. Mich. 1983);
Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
190. Accord Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
see also supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (discussing Nathanson court's view of public
policy).
191. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 143 (1968)
(White, J., concurring):
I also agree that the in pari delicto defense in its historic formulation is not a useful
concept for sorting out those situations in which the plaintiff might be barred because of
his own conduct from those in which he may have been a party to an illegal venture but
is still entitled to damages from other participants.
Id
193. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 125-26.
195. Id Investment analysts and elderly widows, for example, do not deserve the same man-
ner of treatment.
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defense to a tippee's rule lOb-5 action. The courts can best promote
public policy by adopting a comparative fault approach in tippee-tip-
per actions.' 96 Such an approach provides tippees damages in accord-
ance with the circumstances peculiar to each case. 197
Under the comparative fault approach, the tippee still must demon-
strate that the tipper made affirmative misrepresentations or engaged in
reckless conduct in violation of rule lOb-5.198 The fact-finder then
should consider the following factors to formulate an equitable award
of damages: 199 the tippee's sophistication; the tipper's conduct; who in-
196. Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983) (en banc). Thirty-two states have adopted
comparative negligence or comparative fault by statute and nine (including Missouri) have done
so by judicial decision. Id at 11 n.9. Although courts do not usually invoke comparative fault to
determine damages in intentional tort actions, the drafters of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act
noted that in appropriate cases, the courts are not precluded from applying comparative fault.
UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT § 1 comment on conduct covered (1977). Tipper-Tippee
actions pursuant to rule lOb-5 are such "appropriate cases." Courts generally hesitate to pursue a
comparative fault analysis when presented with intentional torts (i.e., battery, assault) because
these torts involve passive plaintiffs in no way responsible for their harm. In contrast, tippee-
tipper actions, where the tipper is the requisite insider and tips for an improper purpose, do not
present the equivalent of the passive plaintiff in battery-assault actions. In the tipper-tippee con-
text the case-to-case disparity of tippee fault justifies the use of comparative fault.
197. See supra note 196.
198. The Supreme Court clearly has stated that a showing of negligence alone on the defend-
ant's part will not satisfy the scienter requirement for a rule lOb-5 action. Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 215 (1976). The Court expressly reserved the question, however,
whether a showing of recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement:
[T]he term "scienter" refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud. In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional
conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act. We need not address here the
question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability
under § 10(b) and Rule lob-5.
Id at 194 n.12. See also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 686 n.5 (1980). Since Rochfelder the Circuit
Courts have unanimously agreed that a showing of recklessness will satisfy the scienter require-
ment. See Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 844 n.27 (D.D.C. 1982), rev'don other grounds, 103 S. Ct.
3255 (1983); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117 (10th Cir. 1982); G.A. Thompson & Co. v.
Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 961 n.32 (5th Cir. 1981); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d
Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Truben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1024 (6th Cir. 1979); Nelson v.
Serwold, 576 F.2d 1132, 1337-38 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Rolf v. Blyth East-
man Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44-47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Sundstrand
Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
199. See Fischer, Products Liability--pplicability of Comparative Negligence, 43 Mo. L. REV.
431 (1978). Professor Fischer suggests the consideration of the following factors for determining
the parties' relative fault:
1. The magnitude of the harm threatened by the conduct; the more dangerous the con-
duct, the more culpable the party is likely to be.
2. The extent to which the harm was foreseeable. In this regard inadvertent conduct is
less culpable than the deliberate creation of a risk of harm. The diminished capacity of
the party or the presence of an emergency are also factors which lessen culpability.
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itiated the fraudulent activity; the conduct of the parties after the tip-
pee's initial purchases; the conduct of the parties prior to the tippee's
purchases; and whether the tippee actually became a co-conspirator 2°°
in the fraudulent venture.2°'
Where the legal foundation for the in pari delicto defense exists,202
adoption of a comparative fault approach to tippee-tipper confficts will
promote public policy. The comparative fault approach helps prevent
the fraud of both tippees and tippers. A comparative fault analysis
creates the prospect of an award of damages against the tipper who
widely and indiscriminately tips customers who invest heavily. The
prospect of irretrievable loss also should deter sophisticated tippees
from acting on "inside information. '203 The comparative fault ap-
proach thus ultimately deters tippers and sophisticated tippees, the par-
ties presenting the greatest "threat" to the investing public.2 °4
3. Balanced against the foregoing factors is the value of the interest the party was pro-
tecting by his conduct. Less culpability is involved in taking an unreasonable risk to
achieve a worthy objective than to achieve an unworthy one. However, this factor must
be considered in light of the alternative means available to the party to protect his
interests.
Id at 438.
200. See supra note 82.
201. The comparative fault approach focuses on the equities between the parties, ensuring that
wrongdoers will not recover damages to the extent that they are at fault. Perma Life Mufflers v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 151 (1968) (Marshall, J., concurring in the result).
202. See supra notes 157-65 and accompanying text. A comparative fault analysis is inappro-
priate when the legal foundation for the in par delicto defense does not exist. In such cases the
tippee is entitled to an unencumbered measure of damages because he has not engaged in any
wrongdoing.
203. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
204. A recent case illustrates the need for a comparative fault approach when a defendant in a
rule lOb-5 action properly raises the inpari delicto defense. In Berner v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319
(9th Cir. 1984) a broker dealer and the president of a small corporation schemed to defraud inves-
tors by spreading false rumors concerning the future of the president's corporation. Id at 1320.
Ten investors brought suit, alleging that the broker and corporate president's actions constituted a
violation of rule lob-5. The investors admitted that they had made their purchases on the basis of
alleged inside information received from the defendants. Id at 1320. The trial court granted the
defendants' motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs unlawfully had acted in par
delicto with the defendants in violating rule lob-5. Id The appellate court reversed, asserting
simply that the allegations of the complaint would demonstrate, if true, that the plaintiffs were not
"equally responsible" for their injuries. Id at 1322, 1324. The court reached its decision without
alluding to the duty to disclose and without considering either Chiarella or Dirks.
In Berner the plaintiffs clearly had violated rule lOb-5. They had received material, nonpublic
information from a broker who, due to his working relationship with a corporate president, occu-
pied the status of a special insider as the Supreme Court envisioned in footnote 14 of Dirks. See
upra notes 154 & 160 and accompanying texts. The broker tipped the plaintiffs for the wrongful
purpose of securing a personal gain (commissions on the trades). See supra note 152 and accom-
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The adoption of a comparative fault methodology also will eliminate
an anomaly in tipper-tippee disputes. All tippers who make active mis-
representations will be held accountable for their acts regardless of
whether they are fiduciary-insiders. °5 A tippee's action will no longer
fail on the "mere fortuity" that the tipper turns out to be a true in-
sider.206 Uniformity in the application of the law will prevail in tippee-
tipper actions.
Matthew D. Menghini
panying text. The plaintiffs, knowing of the defendant's breach, consequently possessed a deriva-
tive duty to disclose prior to trading. See supra notes 151 and accompanying text. The defendants
thus had the proper legal foundation for raising the inpari delicto defense.
These facts warrant an inquiry into the relevant sophistication of the individual investors to
avoid an inequitable result. The in pad delicto defense would bar the actions of those sophisti-
cated investors who actively sought to violate the securities laws and who were at least equally as
reprehensible as the defendants. Those unsophisticated investors, who were in fact "dupes,"
would be allowed to press their claims against the defendants. The Berner court's preoccupation
with finding that the defrauded investors were "equally responsible" for their injuries suggested
that, after properly applying a duty to disclose analysis in future in par! delicto cases, the court
might be willing to conduct a comparative fault analysis to determine which investor's claims
should be allowed to proceed in the interests of equity and justice.
205. Tippers lacking a Chiarella duty of disclosure cannot raise the inpari delicta defense. See
supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text. Tippers who do have a duty to disclose will face the
comparative fault damages award. See supra notes 195-203 and accompanying text.
206. See Grumet v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 336, 341 (D.N.J. 1983).
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